America
Multiple intelligence breakdowns behind Mumbai attacks: New report
By
Arun KumarMultiple
intelligence breakdowns behind Mumbai attacks: New report
By Arun
Kumar
Washington, April 22 Citing what it called "hidden intelligence
breakdowns" behind the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, a new investigative
report has described Mumbai "as a tragic case study in the strengths and
limitations of high-tech surveillance".
An analysis of documents leaked by Edward Snowden contradicted the US
government's claims that the National Security Agency had played a key role in
preventing a follow-up plot against a Danish newspaper in 2009, says the report
by Sebastian Rotella. Rotella, who writes for investigative news site
ProPublica, has extensively reported about key Pakistani-American plotter David
Coleman Headley, "whose reconnaissance for Pakistani spymasters and
terrorist chiefs was crucial to the 2008 terrorist attacks".
In a series of stories and in the 2011 Frontline documentary, "A Perfect
Terrorist", ProPublica had "detailed multiple breakdowns in the US
counter-terror system that allowed Headley to elude detection for years despite
tips that could have prevented the attacks", he said.
"American Terrorist", a major update of the 2011 Frontline film,
airing in the US Tuesday night details the story of Headley's eventual capture
as well as the secret surveillance of Mumbai plotters that took place before
and during the attacks.
The Snowden documents show that, months before Mumbai, British intelligence
began spying on the online communications of Zarrar Shah, a key plotter who was
the technology chief for the Pakistani terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba, Rotella
wrote.
Britain's General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) had the ability to monitor
many of Shah's digital activities, including web searches and emails, during
weeks in which he did research on targets, handled reconnaissance data, and set
up an internet phone system for the attack.
But based on documents and interviews, it appears that the British spy agency
did not use its access to closely analyse data from Shah until a Lashkar attack
squad invaded Mumbai on November 26, 2008.
Nor did the British tell the Americans they were watching Shah beforehand,
despite the close alliance between GCHQ and the NSA, he wrote.
The British data could have complemented separate chatter that the NSA and CIA
were collecting about a potential attack on Mumbai, none of it related to
Headley, Rotella wrote.
Meanwhile, Indian intelligence had separately tracked Shah's communications
before the attack, he wrote.
Once the shooting started, the spy agencies went into high gear, the report
added.
"The British realised that prior targeting of Shah gave them real-time
access to the Karachi control room from which Lashkar chiefs directed the
three-day siege using phones and computers."
GCHQ and NSA pulled a haul of intelligence from the monitoring of Shah and
others that enabled analysts to assemble a "complete operations plan"
of the plot, according to an NSA document cited by ProPublica.
The evidence helped the Western and Indian governments push Pakistan to crack
down on Lashkar.
US officials, the report said, emphasised that they had warned the Indians.
British officials disputed the idea that they had information that could have
prevented an attack. They said they would have shared such intelligence with
India, it said.